By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS
- Earlier this year, Hezbollah secretary general Hasan Nasrullah recounted an important conversation he had with Lebanon's slain premier Rafik Hariri in early February, one week before Hariri's assassination in Beirut. Nasrullah remembered that Hariri had spoken about Hezbollah, saying, "I believe in this resistance. And I am telling you that if I become prime minister again I will not implement the (disarmament) article of (UN) Resolution 1559. I swear to you that the resistance and its weapons will remain until the day a comprehensive regional settlement is reached, not just until (the Israeli) withdrawal from the Sheba Farms."
Hariri, according to Nasrullah, went on, saying, "On that day, when that agreement is reached, I will sit with you and say: 'Sir, there is no further need for the resistance and its weapons.' If we agree, that's what will be. If we disagree, I swear to you and before God (he also swore by his deceased son Hussam) that I will not fight the resistance. I will resign and leave the country (before that happens)."
Hariri has taken details of this conversation with him to the grave, and some in Lebanon today are doubting whether he ever made such a promise to Nasrullah. Were Hariri, an Arab nationalist at heart and a one-time member of the Movement of Arab Nationalists still around, it is debatable whether he would agree with the disarmament of Hezbollah. Yet he was a man loyal to his words and if he made such a promise to Nasrullah, he would have kept it.
Today, however, Lebanon is divided like no time before on whether Hezbollah should keep its arms, or whether it should be demilitarized and fully enter the political system.
Nobody, however, wants to disarm the group by force since this would be considered aggression on the Shi'ite community as a whole. Doing that might easily ignite another civil war in Lebanon. Force is not even an option for the Americans, who know that due to pan-Shi'ite loyalties, aggression on the Shi'ites of Lebanon would enrage the Shi'ites of Iraq and Iran. This would upset the already very turbulent situation in Iraq and alienate America's number one allies in the post-Saddam Hussein order in Iraq. The Americans have realized that the only way to get Hezbollah to disarm is to keep the issue a domestic Lebanese one, negotiated by leaders of the Sunni, Shi'ite and Christian communities. Any excessive US interference would lead to a violent backlash, aggressiveness, and permanently damage any progress.
For its part, Hezbollah is enjoying its current status in Lebanon and the confusion it is creating in Washington. It has gotten to keep its arms even in the wake of the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, maintain its war with Israel, has one party member and one party loyalist in the cabinet of Fouad al-Siniora, and 14 seats in parliament.
Many wrongly believed that once the Syrian army left Lebanon, Hezbollah would be weakened, gradually losing its influence in the country. This turned out to be nonsense, since contrary to what is commonly portrayed in the Western media, Hezbollah is a party that is totally independent in Lebanon from control of the Syrians.
For example, they had four parliamentary seats in 1992, and four for their allies, a total of only eight, and this in the heyday of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon. Today, with Syria out, they have 14 seats. This explains why Hezbollah remained pro-Syrian until curtain fall. Even without the Syrians, Nasrullah knew that he could survive without them. He never relied on the Syrians for his power base, nor did any member of Hezbollah.
Hezbollah might have needed Syrian support in the early 1990s to survive in the post-civil war arena while other armed groups were being disbanded, but it outgrew Syrian patronage. It may have relied on the Syrians for cover and advice, but it received no money, military training or weapons from the Syrians. After its success in driving the Israelis out of Lebanon in May 2000, its stature and credibility inside Lebanon increased tremendously, making any Syrian support unnecessary.
Also in Hezbollah's favor now is the victory of Mamud Ahmadinejad, the president-elect of Iran, who is likely to continue supporting the Lebanese Shi'ite guerillas. A man devoted to the principals of the Iranian revolution of 1979, Ahmadinejad knew that one of its main objectives was Shi'ite emancipation, and helping the Shi'ites of the world achieve victory and end injustice. Had a moderate like Mustapha Moin become president of Iran, for example, or someone like Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was seeking imaginative ways to appease the Americans, then probably the future of Hezbollah would have been in doubt, given the possibility of losing its Iranian patron. Ahmadinejad, however, is an ally of Hezbollah and so is his master, the Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. If the Syrian withdrawal in any way shook the confidence of Hezbollah, then Ahmadinejad's victory certainly restored it.
Saad Hariri, the son of the slain premier, who now leads the biggest parliamentary bloc, told the media on July 25 that Lebanon had a lot of problems and that it was a fragile country; discussing them all at once will lead to instability. He prioritized nation-building, and finding those who killed his father, over the disarmament of Hezbollah. Any disarmament, he said, had to be made within the Lebanese framework and not under pressure from abroad.
This was echoed by French President Jacques Chirac, when he received Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on July 27. The Israeli leader requested French assistance in the disarmament of Hezbollah, and Chirac replied that this was a domestic Lebanese matter that could only be dealt with by the Lebanese themselves, with no outside intervention.
The arms debate
Inside Lebanon, everybody pays tribute to Nasrullah and acknowledges his role in liberating South Lebanon in 2000. The country is sharply divided on disarmament, however. The Christians, and some Muslims, are in favor of disarming the resistance. The Shi'ites, even those who are not members in Hezbollah, are overwhelmingly opposed to such a move.
Nasrullah voiced his views on the matter on the anniversary of the liberation of the South, held in the southern village of Bint Jbeil, "There is talk of disarming the resistance. Any thought of disarming the resistance is pure madness. We do not want to attack anyone. We have never done so. And we will never allow anyone to attack Lebanon. But if anyone, no matter who, even thinks about disarming the resistance, we will fight him like the martyr-seekers in Karbala."
Hezbollah is a symbol of Shi'ite emancipation and power in Lebanon. If it goes away, many people fear that the Shi'ites will return to becoming the under-class of Lebanese society, as they had been in the 1950s and 1960s. Also, many fear that if Hezbollah disarms, it would lose its finances, which allow it to maintain so many charity networks, schools, medical centers and hospitals. Many people rely on these charity organizations for their livelihoods.
As the world discusses the disarmament of Hezbollah, one question should be raised: why do people support Hezbollah? The obvious reason is religion, yet a study conducted in 1996 by Dr Judith Harik, a professor of political science at the American University of Beirut, shows otherwise. In her study, "Between Islam and the State: Sources and Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon's Hezbollah", published in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 40 (March 1996), Harik showed that 70% of Hezbollah's supporters saw themselves only as moderately religious, and 23% said they were religious only out of obligation. Pragmatism and nationalism, rather than Muslim ideology, are the secrets of Hezbollah's success.
Hezbollah enjoys authority and commands unwavering loyalty among Shi'ites because it always appears to be a confident political party that is doing an honorable job in fighting Israel. Adding to the nationalist aspect is the social one, which is that many people in the Shi'ite community, mainly at the grass-root level, rely on Hezbollah for charity and welfare. Hezbollah has succeeded in promoting itself through the media, igniting confidence, safety and security among the 10 million viewers of al-Manar television, for example. Many of those viewers are Shi'ites. Hezbollah's media empire includes al-Manar, a radio station, a newspaper and tons of Internet sites, created by, affiliated with, or supportive of the resistance. Not once does al-Manar, for example, show viewers a member of Hezbollah defeated. Rather, it shows pictures of dead Israelis, real footage of Hezbollah operations, and programs highlighting Hezbollah's charity organization, such as the rebuilding of 5,000 homes destroyed by the Israelis in South Lebanon. Hezbollah is a movement inspired by nationalism rather than religiousness.
Precisely for these reasons, it would be difficult for anyone to tackle Hezbollah. The only way to disarm is for the Shi'ite group to wait until the Israelis leave Sheba, and then quietly lay down their arms and modify their agenda from a military to a political one. The examples of armed groups dismantling themselves the minute independence is achieved are many.
History lessons
One that comes to mind is the National Youth in Syria, whose leaders willingly disarmed when the French left in 1946. Another is that of Irgun and Hagana, the two Zionist military groups that operated in Palestine prior to the creation of Israel in 1948. To the Jewish, they were resistance leaders. To the Arabs, they were terrorists. This is exactly how Hezbollah is viewed today by the Lebanese/Arabs and Israelis/Americans.
One side sees them as a heroic resistance, the other side as terrorists. Many columnists in the Jewish media have been drawing parallels between the two Zionist militias that disarmed in 1948 and the current military groups in the Arab world, saying that they should do the same. This applies, they claim, to Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah.
The story of 1948 says that when David Ben Gurion became prime minister of Israel, he knew that in order to centralize power, he needed to build a strong army and one military authority in Israel. He could not afford another military group operating in Israel. The role of the Irgun and Hagana was acknowledged in having helped achieve victory for Israel in 1948, but now was the time, Ben Gurion argued, for them to lay down their arms and enter the political arena as political parties with no military agenda.
The founders of both parties, Menahem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, curtly refused, claiming that any efforts to disarm the "resistance" was madness. On June 20, 1948, the Irgun office in Paris sent a ship loaded with arms and ammunition to Israel, named the Altalena, to reinforce the resistance. A stern Ben Gurion confronted the ship at the shore of Tel Aviv and ordered his army to sink it, with all arms on board.
After the Altalena Affair, the Hagana was absorbed into the Israeli Defense Forces and Irgun were convinced, unwillingly, to disarm. Begin abandoned military affairs for a political career, ending up as prime minister in 1977, and Shamir did the same, becoming prime minister in 1983. This should be repeated, Jewish writers are saying, in Lebanon today. Hezbollah must disarm, just like Hagana and Irgun, or else the Lebanese government, now freed from Syrian influence, must make strong moves to disarm the resistance, similar to how Ben Gurion sunk the Altalena.
The difference between Ben Gurion's case in 1948 and Lebanon's in 2005 is colossal. Ben Gurion only cracked down on the armed groups after Israel was created in 1948. He would not, and could not do that while Israel was occupied by the British. Hezbollah cannot do that, and the Lebanese government cannot force them to do that, while the Sheba Farms are occupied by the Israelis.
Recently, it was reported in the media that two US officials had held talks with Trad Hamadeh, the Lebanese minister of labor who was nominated into office by Hezbollah. The talks were mainly concerned with Hamadeh trying to convince the Americans to change face, vis-a-vis the resistance in Lebanon, and conduct dialogue with it, rather than pursue confrontation.
When visiting Beirut in July, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was asked if the US would change course towards Hezbollah if the group abandoned its military program. She swiftly replied, "We don't speak in hypotheticals." Yet revealed at her Beirut visit was a guarantee she had received from Ariel Sharon for the Israeli withdrawal from Sheba. This plan was advocated by the US, France and Germany, who are lobbying with Sharon to get him to withdraw. They plan on getting Syria and Iran to support this, in exchange for some sort of deal with both countries that would reduce US pressure on Tehran and Damascus.
Logically, if the Sheba Farms are liberated, there would no longer be any need for Hezbollah to maintain its arms. The argument against Hezbollah would become much easier for Lebanese politicians, American statesmen and Israel. From where they stand today, however, Hezbollah is unlikely to lay down its arms that easily. It will not disarm even if Sheba is liberated. It would still have a high priority on its agenda: protecting the Shi'ites of Lebanon.
Hezbollah as a party works for the Shi'ites, who historically have been a oppressed community. In 1992, eyebrows were raised when Hezbollah decided to enter parliamentary elections because this was a political system that it despised, describing it as feudal and corrupted. Nasrullah at the time replied that he was doing it "for the sake of the oppressed".
Precisely for this reason, he will not abandon the arms of Hezbollah. Hezbollah will remain armed "for the sake of the oppressed".
Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.
Iran dramatically raised the stakes in the international crisis over its nuclear ambitions yesterday, pledging to defy the West by resuming a key part of its sensitive nuclear fuel processing as early as today.
